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Abstract 
Information sharing research has largely focused on capturing operational practices related 
to the exchange of information. A noticeable shortcoming of this developing literature is 
the lack of scholarly attention focused specifically on analytic personnel. The present study 
employs semi-structured interviews with 23 personnel that comprise the analytic unit 
within a regional fusion center located in a large metropolitan area in the United States. 
Findings indicate that there is significant ambiguity surrounding the organizational and 
geographic audiences to which intelligence products should be tailored. Moreover, it 
appears information sharing is sparse and reliant upon personal relationships between 
analysts and external organizations. Lastly, analysts do not receive feedback pertaining to 
the content and effectiveness of intelligence products created. These findings may be 
generalized to other analytical organizations whose primary goal is to gather, analyze and 
disseminate intelligence. Action steps for policymakers are provided.  
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Introduction 
Soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the need for greater 
information sharing and increased intelligence capabilities across various law enforcement 
levels and locales became widely apparent (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 
2004). State and regional fusion centers have been one of the main vehicles for increasing 
both information sharing and intelligence capabilities by acting as hubs for information 
and intelligence on terrorist, criminal, and other public safety threats within a particular 
geographic area (Carter & Carter, 2009a). The scholarly knowledgebase of fusion centers 
and other information sharing agencies is rather sparse given the integral role they play in 
the law enforcement intelligence landscape and the substantial financial commitment 
invested by federal and state governments to keep them operational (Taylor & Russell, 
2011). 
The most robust literature on fusion centers focuses on the experiences of end-users 
– the agencies that receive intelligence from fusion centers (Carter, 2015; Chermak et al.,
2013; Lewandowski & Carter, 2014; Cooney, Rojek, & Kaminski, 2011). Far less is known 
about the experiences of fusion center employees within primary state fusion centers, much 
less regional fusion centers. As geographic location and agency mission can impact 
information sharing (Lewandowski & Carter, 2014; Ratcliffe, Strang, & Taylor, 2013; 
Taylor & Russell, 2011), it is logical to assume that the perceptions of personnel within 
fusion centers may illuminate some of the unknowns regarding law enforcement 
intelligence in contemporary society. Perhaps the most salient aspect of fusion centers is 
the analytic capability they provide to develop intelligence products and assist local 
agencies. However very little is known about the analytic activities within fusion centers 
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or any other analysis center. The present study examines analytic processes and perceptions 
of analytic effectiveness through detailed semi-structured interviews with personnel that 
comprise the analytic unit of a recognized fusion center.  
 
Analytic Capabilities and Information Sharing 
 In 2007, the Homeland Security Council called for an increased use of intelligence-
led policing (hereafter, ILP). While there is no universally agreed upon definition of ILP, 
Carter & Carter (2009a, p.317) defined it as “The collection and analysis of information 
related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable 
intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to 
threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats.” This proactive, 
data-driven approach to policing is believed to lead to an increase in situational awareness 
that helps prevent future terrorist activity and functions as an effective tool in combating 
crime (Carter & Carter, 2012; Homeland Security Council, 2007).  
One reason that ILP is particularly well suited to address issues of homeland 
security is the emphasis it places on analyzing and sharing information. A lack of 
information sharing across various levels and locales of law enforcement has been 
suggested as a major contributor in the failure to prevent the events that occurred on 9/11 
(Zegart, 2007). Full implementation of ILP requires sharing information within and across 
organizations (Carter, Phillips & Gayadeen, 2014); without such sharing, data collection is 
impoverished and so is information and intelligence dissemination (Ratcliffe, 2008; 
Ratcliffe, Strang, & Taylor, 2013).  
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Yet full adoption of ILP is by no means a simple process (Carter, 2016; Ratcliffe, 
2002). The adoption of innovative policing tactics is often an uphill battle (Weisburd & 
Braga, 2006), usually requiring substantial organizational change. With high standards for 
analytic capabilities and multijurisdictional connections, ILP is no exception. As noted by 
Ratcliffe (2008), adoption of ILP is often hindered by a culture of policing that does not 
traditionally prioritize information sharing, and by a lack of leaders who understand the 
potential benefits of ILP. Darroch and Mazerolle, (2012) noted difficulties in ILP 
implementation in New Zealand due partially to poor leadership and lack of openness to 
innovation, and Ratcliffe (2005) found that a lack of resources also inhibited adoption in 
New Zealand. Ratcliffe and Guidetti (2008) found that major organizational change was 
essential to implementation within the New Jersey State Police, and in spite of this, the 
program was still met with notable resistance. In short, ensuring that US law enforcement 
agencies have the analytic capabilities and interconnectedness required for full ILP 
adoption is not an easy undertaking.  
 Of the sparse literature examining analysis in fusion centers, and ILP in police 
agencies more generally, there appears to be consensus that analytic activities lack 
operational value and the ability to inform actionable outcomes. Graphia-Joyal (2010) 
employed a qualitative study that included 49 interviews at four fusion centers in the 
northeast region of the U.S and concluded that these centers had yet to develop a robust 
analytical capability. Her findings suggested that fusion centers are more apt to provide 
investigative support that lacked critical analysis. Such findings have been echoed by other 
scholars examining intelligence-led and analytic-driven policing. In their ethnographic 
study of four intelligence units from the United Kingdom, Innes, Fielding, and Cope (2005) 
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concluded that analytic functions within these units were, in reality, a repackaging of 
traditional policing data and information. The intelligence units examined attempted to 
lend a degree of objectivity to the products created as a result of an analytic process that 
lacked any true scientific application. This may be the result of what Cope (2004) contends 
to be a cultural disconnect between analysts and police personnel as well as a general lack 
of understanding as to how analysis can influence police practice. In their study of 
Canadian police intelligence units, Sanders, Weston, and Schott (2015) found that 
intelligence production and information sharing were steeped in rhetoric and contingent 
upon an agency’s culture to embrace innovative analyses. Though each agency appeared 
to institutionalize analytic work, actual intelligence analysis was an exception rather than 
the rule. Explanations for this analytic and cultural disconnect remain unknown in the 
literature and is a focal point of the present study and a strength of the qualitative design 
employed.  
 
Information Sharing through Fusion Centers 
 While the idea of state and regional collaborative centers is not new to law 
enforcement (Carter & Carter, 2009b), the rise of contemporary fusion centers occurred 
simultaneous to the emergence of ILP within the United States, making their convergence 
especially opportune. In the highly fragmented U.S. law enforcement environment, there 
is great value in the potential for fusion centers to streamline ILP adoption by providing a 
form of centralization. With currently 53 state and 24 regional fusion centers spread 
throughout the country, each center is designed to cover a specific geographic area, 
connecting local, state, and federal law enforcement, emergency services, transportation 
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services, and a wide variety of private businesses within that area (Taylor & Russell, 2012). 
Further, the capacity of these centers to collect, distribute, and analyze raw information can 
act as a force multiplier that enhances the analytic capabilities within their areas of 
operation (Saari, 2010).  
 Implementing ILP requires substantial resources (Carter & Phillips, 2015). Cooney 
et al. (2011) found that the state fusion center in South Carolina was able to act as a support 
service for those agencies that wished to implement ILP but lacked the necessary resources. 
A similar finding was noted by Lewandowski and Carter (2014) in a study of a state fusion 
center. This role of fusion centers seems to be particularly important for smaller agencies 
as they typically lack dedicated intelligence capabilities (Riley et al., 2005) and are far less 
prepared for emergency situations (Burruss et al., 2010). The need for additional support 
among small agencies suggests that regional fusion centers, with their restricted 
geographical focus, may play a particularly important role in the expansion of ILP and 
information sharing.  
 
Qualitative Context and Regional Fusion Centers  
 Due to their comparative infancy in the criminal justice infrastructure, only a small, 
but growing body of research currently informs the effective functioning of fusion centers. 
While this small body of research has provided substantial insights into the ways that fusion 
centers affect information sharing and ILP adoption, very little of this research has involved 
the sort of in-depth examinations that allow for a more complete picture of how the 
information sharing environment is shaped by the mundane experiences of those involved. 
Further, while there is good reason to believe that regional fusion centers may take on 
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different roles and find themselves in different contexts than state fusion centers, no 
research has specifically examined the environment in which they operate.  
 To date, much of the fusion center research has taken the form of survey research 
(Carter, 2015; Chermak et al., 2013; Lewandowski & Carter, 2014; Cooney et al., 2011). 
While these studies have leant great insight into changes in information sharing, the 
activities of centers, and the attributes of end- users across the United States, for what these 
methods gain in generalizability, they lack in detail (Carter, 2015). Chermak, et al. (2013) 
note that while their study allows them to identify patterns of information sharing that hold 
across various fusion centers and fusion center end-users, it does not allow them to dig 
deeper into the reasons for their findings. Carter (2015) urged for such in-depth studies to 
better identify the determinants of information sharing. Few studies have explored fusion 
center functioning through in depth interviews; those that do have shed valuable insights. 
The in-depth interviews conducted by Lewandowski and Carter (2014) allowed for a more 
nuanced understanding of their survey results that alone were rather ambiguous. As 
Graphia-Joyal (2010) noted in her study of those affiliated with four state fusion centers, 
interviewing personnel allowed for exploration of “poorly understood contexts and 
constructs” (p. 362), providing a richer set of data that helps inform future policy and 
research.  
 In addition to this methodological gap in the literature, there is also a substantive 
shortcoming. While much attention has been paid to the experiences of end-users (Carter, 
2015; Chermak et al., 2013; Cooney et al., 2011; Lewandowski & Carter, 2014) and state 
fusion center employees (Gaphia-Joyal, 2010; Lewandowski & Carter, 2014; Saari, 2010), 
research has yet to address the experiences of regional fusion center employees. Regional 
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fusion centers are representative of a third of existing centers and merit greater academic 
attention. This is especially true considering existing research on information sharing and 
ILP that suggests regional fusion centers may more closely align to ILP and local law 
enforcement. First, departmental mission and leadership are important components in the 
adoption of ILP (Ratcliffe, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2008; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008; Ratcliffe et 
al., 2013). Regional fusion centers are often administered by local law enforcement as 
opposed to state police. Thus regional centers may have noticeably different goals and 
styles of leadership than primary state fusion centers.  
Second, location matters. Burruss et al. (2010) concluded that proximity to a major 
city affected homeland security preparedness among small police departments. Saari 
(2010) found that different fusion centers may have different focuses simply as a result of 
their geographic location. Both Cooney et al., (2011) and Lewandowski and Carter (2014) 
found that end-users cared most about intelligence that was close to their geography. 
Unlike state fusion centers, regional centers are often located in a major metropolitan area 
and have a much smaller area of operation; making the sorts of issues they face and 
relationships they have with-end users inherently different from those of the state fusion 
centers. Lastly, perceived similarity is associated with increased information sharing 
between departments (Lewandowski & Nestel, 2016; Roberts & Roberts, 2007; Weiss, 
1998). For regional fusion centers, the agency in charge, most likely to be the local 
municipal police department, will more closely emulate the structure of other local 
agencies than will a state fusion centers which are generally run by state police.  
 In sum, it is logical to assume that the fidelity observed across state and regional 
fusion centers will mirror that of state and local law enforcement. Research from state 
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fusion centers may therefore not be representative of regional fusion centers. More 
specifically, the types of relationships and intelligence discovered in regional centers may 
provide new insights regarding the manner in which information is shared and ILP is 
practiced. This study aims to inform this scholarly shortcoming with twenty-three in-depth 
interviews with analytic personnel within a regional fusion center operating in a major 
metropolitan area.  
 
Methods 
Greene (2014) challenged scholars to balance quantitative prediction and 
qualitative context in policing research. He argued the evidence-based movement, while 
beneficial for a number of reasons, diluted the “cognitive lens” (p. 193) through which 
meaning could be gleaned from research and used to inform practice and future inquiry. 
He further contended that such qualitative context is most appropriate for areas of policing 
research where little is known and dangers could arise if drawing interpretations from 
statistics alone. The present study embraces this approach and employs a qualitative semi-
structured methodology to glean perceptions of intelligence analysis from fusion center 
analytic personnel. This methodological approach is advantageous in that it allows for a 
nuanced and contextualized understanding of practices and issues. King (1994) notes that 
semi-structured approaches are most appropriate for research that is exploratory and 
nuanced as this method relies on open-ended questions that result from probing by the 
researcher and often times a free-flowing dialogue is created that guides the interview 
process.  
 10 
Moreover, research data is difficult to obtain from fusion centers given the 
sensitivity of intelligence-related topics and intelligence personnel’s unwillingness to 
discuss their work (Chermak et al., 2013; Carter, 2015; Lewandowski and Carter, 2014). 
This has led to a lack of empirical research in this field especially regarding the employees 
intended to be the medium through which information is shared, analyzed, and 
disseminated. This qualitative methodology not only allows for the nuanced nature of 
information sharing and analysis to be captured, but it also creates a research environment 
in which a rapport can be developed between the intelligence personnel and the researchers. 
As a result, this methodological design is best positioned to maximize the collection of 
desired data.  
Despite the limited literature on fusion centers, the researchers leveraged previous 
research on fusion center and intelligence sharing in contemporary law enforcement to 
construct the semi-structured interview instrument. This instrument focused on key 
operational aspects of law enforcement intelligence, information sharing, and analysis. 
More specifically, questions were contextualized within the fusion center environment and 
directly related to the impact on state and local law enforcement. A combination of 
researcher notes and audio recordings of each interview were transcribed into a single 
source document. To enhance the validity of interpretations from the interviews, additional 
teleconferences and continual communication exchanges with fusion center personnel 
occurred to solicit feedback, clarify and reaffirm the information gathered. Confirmation 
of perceptions is especially prudent given the sensitive nature of the research topic and the 
limited literature to which results can be compared and contrasted. The research team 
wanted to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the analysts’ views of the intelligence 
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products they created and the intelligence-led practices their products were intended to 
inform.  
 
Study Context: Organizational Characteristics 
As perceptions of organizational operations within policing have been shown to 
vary across personnel within the same organization (Rosenbaum, 2002), the present study 
utilizes interviews with each personnel member assigned to the fusion center’s analytic 
capacity. The fusion center at which the research was conducted is located in the U.S. and 
is designated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as one of 78 “Recognized 
Fusion Centers” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016). A recent report by the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2013) documented the organizational capabilities 
and practices of each fusion center nationwide and quantified operational scores for each 
center across a range of metrics. Based on these metrics, the fusion center of study in the 
present research received an “average” overall rating compared to centers across the 
country. This rating lends credence to the generalizability of the findings to be presented 
in the current study as the operations and practices of the center of study are consistent 
with those nationwide. Relatedly, Appendix A provides a list of organizational capacities, 
policies, and practices for the fusion center under study. These organizational 
characteristics are provided to best contextualize the organization from which the analyst 
perceptions and findings of the present study were observed.  
The fusion center of study, overseen by a large municipal police department, has 
an analytic unit of 28 personnel; 24 analysts and four analyst supervisors. Each person is 
assigned full-time to the fusion center. All analytic personnel were initially e-mailed by the 
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supervisor who stated that the research team would be e-mailing to make an appointment 
with them for a study being conducted at the fusion center. This assured the employees that 
approval had been granted for them to speak to the researchers and that there was 
organizational buy-in from supervisors. The research team reached out to the personnel 
and asked them to participate in a voluntary study; the team then conducted interviews at 
the fusion center in a private conference room. The interviews were conducted over the 
course of six months. Of the initial list of 28 employees, three were out on sick leave or on 
a tour of duty for the military while two others were unable to be scheduled for interviews 
due to logistical problems. A total of 23 persons, consisting of all 21 analysts and two 
supervisors were interviewed for 45-60 minutes; representing 82 percent of the personnel 
from the fusion center’s analytic unit. Respondents had been employed by the fusion center 
for an average of 18 months (range of three to 43 months). Employees that were hired 
during the course of the study were not interviewed; additionally, there were four 
employees that were interviewed who were reassigned or left the fusion center during the 
course of the study. Analytic personnel primarily came from a state and local law 
enforcement background (70%) with the remainder comprised of a mix from various 
outside federal and local agencies, a composition consistent with fusion centers from across 
the country (U.S. House of Representatives, 2013).  
In the analysis, we make a distinction between civilian analysts and police analysts. 
Police analysts (43% of the sample) are those analysts who are sworn police officers of the 
lead municipal agency who are temporarily assigned to the fusion center as an analyst. 
They have generally received at least one analytical training course and may attend 
occasional workshops held at the fusion center. Conversely, civilian analysts (57% of the 
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sample) are those who are not sworn officers and whose training is often more extensive 
and can include courses offered by DHS including risk analysis training specifically for 
fusion center analysts, introductory and intermediate risk assessment courses as well as 
cyber security training, 
 
Analytic Strategy 
The survey instrument utilized in the present study is provided in Appendix B. 
Nvivo (v10) software was utilized to organize and identify thematic constructs from the 
qualitative information gleaned from the interviews. Key response traits, indicators, and 
themes were reviewed and agreed upon by the research team. To enhance the validity of 
interpretations from the interviews, additional teleconferences and continual 
communication with fusion center personnel occurred to solicit feedback, clarify, and 
reaffirm the information gathered (King, 1994). Though the research team identified 
additional information believed to be insightful, only the findings which gained saturation 
and consensus among those interviewed are reported.  
Saturation of qualitative findings is a subjective threshold (Fusch & Ness, 2015) 
with debate surrounding necessary sample size (O’Reilly & Parker, 2013). Guest, Bunce 
and Johnson (2006) note that data saturation may be attained with as little as six interviews. 
The present study sought to establish saturation using three methods. First, individual 
interviews were employed as opposed to focus groups of analytic personnel. This allowed 
the research team to safeguard against the limitation of groupthink in that dominant 
members of a group, or position types (such as supervisors) may pressure others to conform 
to group consensus (MacDougall & Baum, 1997). Second, different personnel types were 
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interviewed that included analysts and analytic supervisors. This personnel diversity allows 
for the triangulation of individual perceptions of different personnel types to converge on 
consistent themes (Denzin, 2012); thus strengthening the reliability and validity of 
qualitative findings (Stavros & Westberg, 2009). A saturation grid was employed to cross-
tabulate qualitative data across respondents and positions to demonstrate levels of 
saturation (Brod et al., 2009). 
 
Findings 
 Perceptions from the fusion center personnel were insightful and clustered within 
four areas pertaining to intelligence analysis; two of which were deemed primary and two 
secondary based on respondent feedback. The two primary areas of concern for analytic 
personnel were the sources of information and recipients of the analytic products. Sources 
of information pertain to the databases, online web content, and law enforcement products 
analysts rely on to develop intelligence products. Recipients of analytic products are the 
intended audience to receive disseminated intelligence products from the fusion center (i.e., 
persons on the listservs). These areas represent the issues most commonly broached, and 
emphasized, by the respondents. Secondary issues were related to feedback and geographic 
focus of analytic products. Feedback pertains to commentary or reaction from end-users 
(recipients) of the intelligence products disseminated. The geographic focus of analytic 
products refers to municipalities, counties, or jurisdictions to which intelligence products 
are tailored. These issues are categorized as secondary as they were not mentioned by 
respondents as frequently, but were emphasized as salient to the analytic mission of the 
fusion center. Findings are presented in a manner consistent with these themed focal areas.  
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Sources of Information  
Creating actionable intelligence products is a critical function of fusion centers. In 
an era of competitive budgets, entities need to demonstrate their value through a unique 
capacity to inform stakeholders of intelligence they would not have otherwise received. 
Central to this ability is access to quality information that can be integrated into the analytic 
process. The premise of fusion centers is that information from more diverse sources gleans 
more accurate intelligence (Clark, 2007). The “fusion” of raw information adds to the 
collective body of information for analysis which leads to a better output (Carter & Carter, 
2009b). Respondents were asked two main questions that pertained to raw information: 
“Can you please describe the sources of information and data that you use when creating 
intelligence products?” and “Which sources of information are most useful and do you 
most frequently utilize?” 
A large majority of those interviewed (78%) stated that open sources were used to 
provide information for creating products while a large percentage (43%) further stated 
that open sources were used exclusively. Many respondents seemed to use a combination 
of sources even if open source reporting was the main source. “Media reports, some 
government open source portals provide a little bit more targeted, open source materials 
through controlled web-logging and opensource.gov. We use SAR reporting and limited 
police reporting. We also do our own qualitative collection through interviews.” 
Respondents indicated that open sources included mainstream media (such as CNN and 
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FoxNews) and social media, which one interviewee acknowledged was “a Pandora’s box 
because it is not entirely accurate.” More of the civilian analysts acknowledged that they 
use what is believed to be more reliable open sources such as, “government open source 
portals (which) provide a little bit more targeted open source materials…(and) SAR 
reporting and limited police reporting.” When probed for specifics, the portal of 
government open source material was identified as the Open Source Center2 operated by 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in addition to “HSIN, opensource.gov, 
and Tripwire...i.e. not just open source media types of things”. This portal essentially serves 
as a government-run data mining tool to capture and categorize publicly available 
information that may be queried by pre-approved law enforcement personnel.  
While some end-users may not necessarily appreciate the inclusion of open source 
material in the bulletins (Lewandowski & Carter, 2014), the reason for the reliance on open 
source information is because of the medium by which the bulletins are sent out. E-mails 
are sent to a variety of listservs that include both law enforcement and the private sector. 
Because end-users cannot receive classified information, the bulletins cannot be classified. 
Despite having “access to classified information through our system” the analysts “do not 
write anything or produce anything at a classified level for dissemination. (They) usually 
take those and bring them down to an FOUO (For Official Use Only) or LES (Law 
Enforcement Sensitive) level.” A supervisor reiterated the importance of not being able to 
disseminate classified information: “The secure sites would never be cited as a source. We 
use it to confirm something and it would have to be supported with open source information. 
We would never disclose anything from the secure room on the lower classified side.” This 
                                                        
2 https://www.opensource.gov/public/content/login/login.fcc 
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policy is consistent with national fusion center standards for intelligence sharing (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013). During one of the follow-up telephone 
discussions with one of the analyst supervisors it was discovered that the fusion center has 
since developed a website and a secure network that users can sign into if they have the 
necessary clearance.  
Civilian analysts who had more training than the police analysts stated that the use 
of open sources was not problematic as many of them saw their work as necessary for 
informing the private sector by looking for any communication regarding transportation, 
railways, gas, water, or electricity that could disrupt private sector operations. They saw 
their role as one in which they vetted the information for their stakeholders. In agreement 
with a supervisory analyst, many acknowledged that open sources should be used as a tool 
for secondary information rather than a primary resource. This respondent explained, 
“There’s a lot of media reporting which…should be used…to go conduct further research 
on an incident. So, for example, if an incident happens in [city], you are getting the law 
enforcement side of it through communications, but you’re also monitoring the media 
reporting side so you can kind of confirm information from a variety of different sources.” 
Interviews with analysts confirmed this approach of using open sources for analysis, but 
civilian analysts were more likely to perceive value in this type of information sharing than 
the police analysts. This could be because the civilian analysts have more training than the 
police analysts and are more likely to understand the value of confirmed intelligence; 
moreover, they may be more knowledgeable of additional open source databases that they 
can search to find more information. 
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In addition to open sources, respondents indicated Fusion Center Liaison Officers 
(FLO) and other law enforcement agencies as a preferred and reliable source of information 
for analytic products. One analyst indicated, however, that while he would like more 
information from the FLO and local police, this type of information “relies on officers at 
the district level to provide reporting up the chain to the (fusion center) which is pretty 
atrophied. I wish we had greater access to the district level police reporting, however, 
there’s not a standardized report format or procedure for sending those reports up, so 
there’s a kink at many levels in the information flow.” The majority of persons interviewed 
(70%) indicated that there is also little or no information received from external agencies. 
Civilian analysts saw this as a problem of marketing and not having enough outreach 
whereas police analysts saw this as a problem of buy-in from the police officers and 
agencies in the fusion center’s area of responsibility. As a result, analysts must rely on the 
databases to which they have access.  
Analysts who believed that information sharing was lacking stated that this obstacle 
not only applied to exchanges across different agencies, but also lacking from federal 
agencies to local agencies; moreover, information sharing within the same local agency 
could, at times, be limited despite existing within the same organization and committing to 
the ILP philosophy. Approximately 25 percent of the analysts interviewed surmised that 
this lack of sharing could be attributed to “personality conflicts”. This led to what one 
analyst referred to as politics; she believed sharing would improve if “a very strong leader 
could kind of bring the building together. I think the collective is quite strong and there is 
a lot of talent but people are starting to get down by the politics.” This was reiterated by 
about 43 percent of the analysts who stated that the sharing mindset has to “come from the 
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commissioner to say you will support this and any efforts to sabotage it or negate its 
effectiveness need to be dealt with harshly.” There was also evidence that police analysts 
believe the information sharing that does occur is a result of personal and trusted 
relationships between an analyst and the person sharing the information from the outside 
agency: “I only get information because I can call my friend in (nearby town) who worked 
in our department for ten years.” Another police analyst reiterated this point by saying that 
much of his understanding of the needs of the end-users comes from “people I talk to in 
passing when I say I work at the (fusion center).” This finding is rather intuitive as police 
analysts already have a network from which to gather information; on the other hand, 
civilian analysts hired at the fusion center years after the center was established could not 
rely on information from acquaintances because they did not have any when beginning 
work at the fusion center. Instead they relied on their formal training for gathering 
information.  
 
Product Recipients  
Once information is gathered by analysts at the center, it must then be analyzed and 
communicated into products that the audience will find actionable. The audience or end-
users are an important factor in determining product content. If the intended audience was 
local law enforcement, analysts would consider the creation of situational awareness or 
officer safety bulletins. These types of informational bulletins would look very different 
from those that target security personnel within the private sector. This understanding of 
the nuances involved in writing toward a specific audience is reflected by half of the 
respondents, mostly civilian analysts, who stated that the intended audience is evaluated 
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on a case-by-case basis. Bulletins are written for specific audiences such as first responders, 
law enforcement, the private sector, or even specific law enforcement agencies, like a 
particular transit agency. One analyst acknowledged that “some information is directly 
geared to a specific police department, police departments generally, departments within a 
specified county, or it is directly related to the health department or to the FBI. It depends 
on the information received.” An analyst that stated they were specifically responsible for 
counterterrorism felt that the fusion center’s “main customer in my view should be the 
mayor of (major city)” because they respond to emergencies. This analyst was the only one 
who believed that the mayor should be the designated customer.  
Forty three percent of respondents stated that they felt the intended audience was a 
general law enforcement audience. It seems this position was held by many of the analysts 
who had come from the local police agency. One analyst explained that this was due to 
“the nature of world today (which) is some active shooter or terrorism tips, suspicious 
activity reporting, things like that. We don’t do much specifically geared towards specific 
sectors unless we have a reason.” We surmise that the difference in views of audience may 
stem from a more narrow view on behalf of the police officers who later became analysts. 
While they do a good job of evaluating the needs of the local law enforcement community, 
they may be less proficient in understanding the intelligence needs of the private sector or 
other sectors outside law enforcement. 
All of the analysts indicated their knowledge of several lists to which an analyst 
could disseminate products. There are For Official Use Only (FOUO) and Law 
Enforcement Sensitive (LES) listservs for which analysts can disseminate law 
enforcement-specific bulletins. The respondents that indicated developing products for a 
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general law enforcement audience believed it was their job to disseminate information to 
as many people as possible within their legal authority; thus promoting an environment of 
open information sharing. Analysts alluded to an understanding that this meant intelligence 
products need to go to an audience that has “a right or legal authority to know (which) 
dictates who anything is going out to.” This principle is the same across all fusion centers 
where there is a two pronged test which includes first a “right to know" and then a “need 
to know”.   
Analysts who saw their audience as a more general audience tended to see their 
audience in terms of the two aforementioned listservs and sought to ensure that products 
were tailored to the security level of the listserv to whom it was sent. In other words, the 
LES bulletins may have contained slightly different information based on the security level 
of the list, but this was the only difference. One of the respondents explained that the 
“customers (they) are serving are broad; that is what the basis of the fusion center is 
(because) it is not centered in one area… we are serving everybody from (the chief of 
police) who may have to make a command deployment decision based on information we 
are sending all the way to the public health official in (nearby county), the private sector in 
charge of information security or a security director at the (major league) ball park who 
has to brief his senior leader and security directors.” Another respondent noted they 
“tended to write to diverse levels of groups to get the information out to everyone.” 
Therefore, some of the analysts try to cast a wide net because they recognize that not 
everyone will receive the intelligence or will even need the intelligence.  
 Respondents were asked to clarify who they perceived the actual audience to be 
when disseminating products. The research team believed this was an important difference 
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because even if they intend for the products to be sent to a particular audience, the 
recipients may knowingly be different from the intended audience. For example, one 
analyst pointed out that they write and would like for the bulletins to be seen by patrol 
officers, especially because they are the people who would greatly utilize situational 
awareness and officer safety bulletins. As the respondents noted, “I make sure that the 
commanders have it and then it is up to the commanders to disseminate.” However, “if they 
choose not to, then the fusion center has no input on that…Once it leaves here, there’s so 
many different aspects of the police department, so many different units and everything 
that it is tough to say who the actual audience is.” Further probing questions indicated the 
actual audience appeared to be the same as the intended audience most of the time.  
Disseminating the intelligence on the listserv was not a guarantee that it would be 
read by end-users. For example, while half of the analysts stated that they create products 
for general law enforcement, one analyst pointed out that they received feedback from 
officers that they “never heard about that or it never came out of the captain’s office.” This 
may be due to an inability to formally identify the audience for all of the analysts. Analysts 
with more training recognized this need so that the intelligence products have more 
meaning or at least an increased readership: “I know that the analytic team is trying to do 
a better job of at least formalizing in our heads who that end-user is because it is a broad 
audience so some people may say ‘oh well that’s not for me,’ but you know you do try and 
actually think about who the end-user is on this product.” As the respondent notes, 
recipients of bulletins that do not pertain to them may lose interest in all bulletins that come 
from the fusion center. Thus, they may divest from paying attention to products in general.  
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The people that comprise the actual listserv is difficult to assess. While all of the 
people on the listserv have signed the necessary non-disclosure forms, many of the people 
on the listserv seemed to be an amalgamation of different sectors rather than a more precise 
assessment of all relevant stakeholders. For example, one of the supervisory analysts 
explained that they were not “100% familiar with the distribution lists…I would assume 
that we hit all of the sectors. I know we hit private sector, I know we have law enforcement, 
fire is on there, and then EMS.” At least one civilian analyst says that one of the “main 
concerns among the analysts here is that we often don’t know who our end user is and what 
the utility it is that we’re doing.” However, the center continues to find holes in its listservs 
including schools and universities. “More and more as we get into it, there’s that light that 
goes on that says ‘we should have reached out to those people’ or ‘what could we have 
done at this level?’” There’s always something new and it’s a total learning process that 
goes on and on. It’s continually being refined.” This is to be expected given how much the 
center is trying to expand into the private sector. 
 
Feedback 
A primary reason that analysts seem to be unsure of the representation of the actual 
intelligence product audience is because of a lack of feedback. The feedback loop is one of 
the most important elements in the intelligence process because it helps analysts understand 
what information or intelligence is needed by the stakeholders (Carter & Carter, 2009b; 
Ratcliffe, 2008). Analysts can then tailor products to maximize effectiveness for end-users. 
Thirty five percent of the analysts indicated they had not received feedback from any 
intelligence recipient; whether this was from stakeholders who received the products, other 
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analysts within the fusion center, or supervisory analysts. Respondents who indicated they 
received no feedback were highly dissatisfied with the lack of feedback and expressed a 
strong desire to develop feedback channels to improve products. For instance, when asked 
if she received feedback, one analyst said, “That has been something that has bothered me 
from the beginning. One of the major steps in the intelligence cycle is feedback before you 
go to that next step…I have talked with leadership about this.” This was a theme among 
many of the civilian analysts who had transitioned from careers as analysts in other sectors 
or received advanced training and understood the intelligence cycle. While every analyst 
indicated they would like more feedback, it seemed that police analysts wanted the 
feedback to better understand the needs of the community; this was slightly different from 
the civilian analysts who wanted both feedback and information which they could then 
analyze for a greater variety of sources.    
A large minority indicated they received feedback from various sources, but that 
the feedback was very minimal or not constructive. Of the feedback received, respondents 
indicated it was mostly general positive comments such as “Good job.” The most common 
type of feedback was requests for additional information. Three respondents did note that 
officers informed them that a product led to an arrest. When respondents were probed 
regarding mediums through which feedback travels, common responses were that end-
users would reply to the original distribution email or a call from other fusion centers 
asking about a particular bulletin that had been emailed to the distribution lists. Feedback 
was almost never received from local law enforcement, the intended audience of the 
analytic products. This had the unfortunate effect of leaving at least one respondent to 
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believe that “people are not engaged enough to have an opinion.” This is in keeping with 
past literature about feedback (Lewandowski & Carter, 2014; Ratcliffe & Walden, 2010). 
 This is not because of a lack of trying on the part of the fusion center which 
“includes a product survey with all of our products that we send out. We’re supposed to. It 
may go out to 1,000 people, we may get one or two back.”  The analysts seemed to disagree 
on how many surveys were received by the center but agreed that it is still not enough to 
help them understand who receives the products and what more they want from the 
products, “We do the product surveys from time to time, we receive “good job” but for the 
amount of surveys going out, we receive very little back. Rarely, do we get requests that 
they would like to receive something in particular. I don’t think we do good outreach in 
that way. We receive about 200 back out of 2000 surveys going out.” This idea of the 
importance of outreach can also be seen in another analyst’s response regarding the 
feedback. “We’re just not tied in enough with these units or have strong enough 
relationships with these units to really notice if it’s doing anything. All we see is whether 
or not it was sent, and that’s a success. I think that’s true of a lot of intelligence agencies.” 
The analyst is reiterating the point that outreach helps them understand how their 
intelligence bulletins are being used if they cannot coerce recipients to respond to an online 
survey.  
First, however, the end-users need to become knowledgeable about the products 
and many of the civilian analysts seemed to be more optimistic about the utility of their 
products once the potential end-users became aware of them as evidenced here: “I think 
people will be receptive to it; they just need a better understanding of it, and we need to 
make better use of the tools out there like DHS…they have got all of those different fusion 
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liaisons products that we could be taking advantage of to reach people such as the 
firefighters, EMTs, police officers, public health officials.” As another civilian analyst 
pointed out, end-users cannot ask for products they do not know about: “Send me an email 
that says “I’d like to see a product on something…” But I don’t know if they don’t engage 
because they don’t know what they want, like we talked about before, they don’t know 
what they want, they don’t know how to reach out, or they just don’t think about it. I don’t 
know.” The analyst reiterates the frustration that all analysts either directly spoke about, or 
at least alluded to: the lack of feedback.  
While all analysts were frustrated by the dearth of responses, police analysts tended 
to be a bit more pessimistic about the response to marketing efforts: One police analyst 
said that he goes “out to meetings, law enforcement group meetings... (and) send(s) out 
information over the internet, over to different groups that are out there…Generally 
speaking, the effort made by other people has been low.” This may point to a difference in 
the amount of time at the center. Many of the civilian analysts were newer, and while they 
were aware of many of the same problems as the police analysts, they seemed to be less 
jaded than the police analysts who had seen the fusion center grow from its infancy. 
 
Geographic Focus  
Related to the issue of intended audience was the geographic focus of analytic 
products. Approximately half of the respondents indicated the fusion center was city-
centric rather than regional. As one analyst stated, “We support the region if they want us 
to check our database. We provide investigative support.” This is somewhat understandable 
given that the leadership of the fusion center and many of the analysts are employees of 
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the city police force. One analyst stated that another reason for the concentration on the 
city was because the city “is the epi-center of this region for crime and terrorism.” Large 
urban areas contain many of the nation’s critical infrastructures which are the focus of 
many intelligence products.  
However, respondents indicated that despite the importance of the large 
metropolitan area and organizational commitment to the employing agency, the fusion 
center should have a regional focus. As explained by one analyst, “We have a lot of critical 
infrastructure here that needs to be protected and that kind of thing, but again, when you 
are talking about trafficking, staging areas are set up in the peripheries of cities. The 
transportation aspect of trafficking, public airlines, trains, all of that stuff: the city is only 
a hub for it. Not having a visual on the data that travel generates once it leaves the city 
limits our ability to really provide any analysis on it.” The analyst brings up a valid point: 
while much of the focus of a regional fusion center is the city, analysts need to be aware 
that criminals travel into and out of the city to other parts of the region. The analyst went 
on to question whether or not a city entity should manage a regional center because it would 
perhaps hinder their ability to see past city borders. However, 21 percent of respondents, 
generally more senior-level respondents, perceived the fusion center to be trying to address 
this issue for the future. For example, these respondents indicated they had started to reach 
out to more stakeholders outside of the immediate city and even other fusion centers in the 
region. As pointed out by one of the supervisory analysts, though, it is also incumbent upon 
the region outside of the city to send resources and data to the fusion center so that analysts 
can use it to better assess the threats facing the whole region. 
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 One of the reasons that was commonly cited for the city focus was for the already 
mentioned operational command of the fusion center by the local police, but also the 
amount of resources and databases to which they have access. The analysts and employees 
are therefore most familiar with the city and have connections in the city. A civilian analyst 
who had not been at the fusion center long informed the interviewer that “there are some 
things we send out that have to do with (nearby states), but I feel like (the city) is the center 
of it…As for the people here, I would say they’re definitely all city-centric. Most of the 
(fusion center), a lot of the personnel here, they are (city) police officers. They do have 
other partner agencies that are here, but again, they’re based in (the city).” Another civilian 
analyst who was hired more recently agreed that the products and analysis had a less 
regional focus because of the inability of the analysts and officers to gain meaningful 
partnerships outside of the city. “I think once again it comes down to that it’s supposed to 
be a regional fusion center, but it’s (city) run, so there’s that breaking down the barriers of 
going north, south, east, and west to get the other partners involved. It’s supposed to be 
more about the partners than it is about the city.” The analyst implies that outreach to 
partners all over the region for purposes of receiving information is important but is more 
difficult without pre-existing relationships.  
While all respondents, especially civilian analysts, saw outreach as critical to 
garnering support and receiving data and resources from outside the city, one supervisor 
whose affiliation was to the local police department affirmed the importance of the need 
for regional partners to accept the fusion center’s invitation in order to truly build a regional 
partnership. Once again, this reaffirms the difference in views of how to create buy-in from 
agencies outside the city. Employees of the police department running the fusion center 
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felt they had reached out to local agencies and were not receiving the feedback they had 
requested whereas civilian analysts, or those not employed directly by the city police 
department, felt that more outreach and education of the capabilities of the fusion center 
needed to be communicated.  
 
Discussion  
Published research using survey data has helped to identify patterns of information 
sharing that hold across various fusion centers and fusion center end-users. Past studies 
have shown us that information sharing can vary by organizational goals, perceived 
similarity with the agency providing the information, and simply by geographic location. 
This study added to the current literature by analyzing qualitative data; the study revealed 
that the inclusion of people into the formal system will inevitably lead to more subjectivity 
in the process; information sharing is hindered by the relationships that analysts maintain 
with other human potential sources of information. Moreover, the analysts’ past 
experiences will influence their perceptions of the identity and needs of the audience they 
believe are in need of the information.   
Research specifically focused on analytical personnel from information sharing 
organizations is limited. This gap is largely due to the difficulty associated with gaining 
research access to fusion centers and personnel hesitancy to share information pertaining 
to intelligence issues (Chermak et al., 2013). This environment of secrecy subsists despite 
the 78 officially recognized fusion centers and other information sharing entities such as 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) 
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across the U.S. that are designed to collect, analyze, and disseminate information and 
intelligence intended to keep stakeholders aware of risks facing their jurisdictions.  
The researcher undertook the study with the premise that regional fusion centers 
might find themselves in an advantageous position to facilitate the fusion center mission 
specifically and ILP more generally. The goal of this study was to analyze the perceptions 
of information sharing, intelligence products, and ILP practices of the employees of the 
analytic unit of one regional fusion center. The findings are insightful. 
The study revealed very critical inferences that need to be explored in future 
research. To begin, the information that analysts receive should be collected through 
information sharing initiatives and should help to create products that are analytical in 
nature. This study found evidence that information sharing still poses a significant 
challenge due to personality clashes, a reluctance to work with others, and an over-reliance 
on personal relationships. This finding lends support to Carter’s (2015) assertion that inter-
organizational information sharing among law enforcement would benefit from improved 
face-to-face opportunities to develop rapport. While all of the analysts recognized the role 
that information sharing plays in producing better intelligence, many of the analysts felt 
stymied by an inability to communicate with other departments; both within and outside of 
the physical fusion center building. This may be due to the paramilitary chain- of-command 
and the practice of stove piping which may still be occurring due to fear of compromising 
their investigations. Respondents also surmised this attitude could be derived from hostile 
personalities and perhaps a desire to keep one’s case protected from outside appropriation.  
While this may not necessarily be the case at all fusion centers or even other police 
departments, this finding shows the relevance of human relationships in the information 
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sharing initiative. Given the critical role of analysts, it is important to the mission of the 
fusion center that all who staff a fusion center support the most basic motive for a fusion 
center: information sharing. This finding also provides more evidence for Ratcliffe’s 
(2008) assertion that adoption of ILP is hindered by a culture of policing that does not 
traditionally prioritize information sharing, and by a lack of leaders who understand the 
potential benefits of ILP. 
Supporting the mission of a fusion center will help the analysts coordinate with 
other stakeholders and entities so that greater information sharing is occurring for more 
targeted analysis. Other information sources also need to be utilized so that bulletins are as 
robust as possible. The present study observed open-sources of information as a commonly 
utilized resource for analysts; mirroring the national sample findings of Carter and 
Chermak (2012). While open sources seem to be the favored source for information, at 
least one analyst openly stated that he believed the use of open sources was unfortunate 
because “once it is open source, it is pointless to put products out on things.” However, the 
value of the fusion center is that the end-users know that the information is credible and 
has been vetted through participating agencies and databases so that the end-user has more 
confidence in the information. 
One challenge fusion centers face in relying less on open source information is 
balancing the need to reach a large audience and the desire to disseminate intelligence that 
is useful. Analysts are limited by the sources they can use in putting together bulletins 
because of the classification level of the recipients. The only way to avoid this is to put all 
products on a secure portal. This is an option that some fusion centers, including more 
recently the fusion center under study, have considered or put into practice, but readership 
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may be reduced when requiring stakeholders to sign into a secure portal instead of logging 
into their email. 
Open sources may still be useful if the information is applied in the most beneficial 
manner. Analysts can use open source information to help stakeholders understand how 
the information applies to them. For example, if an analyst receives open source 
information about an attack on an embassy overseas, the analyst may analyze the 
information to make it more relevant to the stakeholder. Does the attack have any bearing 
on the local police officer in suburban America? Are there any communities in the area 
that might also be under attack of which the police need to be aware? These are questions 
that the analyst can help answer and that move the information beyond informative to 
useful.  
Perceptions regarding the intended audience of the analytic products were 
intriguing. There appears to be ambiguity surrounding to whom the analysts should be 
tailoring the center’s products. Analysts were split in their beliefs that products were 
intended to inform a general or law enforcement audience while other analysts wrote to 
more specific audiences on a case-by-case basis. However, the more precise response 
concerning the actual audience is most likely a hybrid of the two perceived audiences. 
There are three listservs to which the analysts disseminate intelligence products. Two of 
the lists contain law enforcement officers and have to be broken apart because there are too 
many people on the list. The third list is comprised of private sector stakeholders who may 
not have the same clearances as law enforcement, but who nonetheless need to be informed 
of risks facing the community. Within each list, however, there is no further break-down. 
Chiefs, captains, sergeants, and patrol all receive the same information even though they 
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may not all need the same information. This is also the case with the private sector list 
which may contain stakeholders from the water, gas, or public transportation sectors. 
Analysts should have a particular audience in mind when creating a product rather than 
disseminating products for the sake of sending something out.  
Moreover, as a regional fusion center, the focus of the products that are 
disseminated to the stakeholders within the area of responsibility (AOR) should be relevant 
to all people within the AOR, not just those who are in the largest urban area within this 
area. While the large, urban center may face more risks, this does not necessarily mean that 
the area surrounding the city should be neglected. Additionally, if stakeholders within the 
AOR who are not in the city continually receive intelligence products they feel do not relate 
to their needs, they may cease to read products. This could perhaps lend insight as to why 
the fusion center receives such little feedback. The products may simply not be viewed as 
important or effective by the end-users.  
Finally, the study was able to help us understand how the use of police versus 
civilian analysts may lead to a difference in the understanding of the audience identity, the 
needs of the audience, as well as the ideal practices for gathering information. While police 
analysts understand the local landscape well and have a greater network of people to rely 
on for information, they may not be able to understand the needs of agencies outside their 
community or law enforcement. Civilian analysts, on the other hand, are formally trained 
in utilizing all types of open sources and understand that outreach and education is 
necessary for agencies outside of the fusion center to subscribe to the fusion center model. 
This study is not without limitations. An ideal interview methodology would utilize 
a neutral location for personnel interviews to be conducted as to minimize any perceived 
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employer influence. Interviews were conducted at the fusion center in an effort to minimize 
the burden on staff time and maximize participation in the study. Active recruitment from 
all areas of the fusion center could not be achieved given time and logistical constraints 
placed on analytic personnel in addition to the study lacking an incentive to participate 
beyond informing best practices and lessons learned. The present study does not capture 
perceptions from other personnel within the fusion center. Though the analytic personnel 
interviewed for this study represent 70 percent of the center’s full time staff, it is plausible 
that other personnel within the center perceive intelligence products and intended 
audiences differently. Moreover, analysts may not be aware of strategic planning and 
initiatives ruminating from upper management and local stakeholders; an issue plaguing 
many aspects of police organizations (Mastrofski & Willis, 2010). While this is a limitation 
of the study, it is important to understand how analysts may affect intelligence that is 
disseminated from the fusion center. 
In addition, feedback regarding intelligence products may be channeled to other 
personnel within the center. As a result, a barrier to effective feedback may be within the 
center as opposed to a problem with end-users. A further limitation of the study is an 
inability to compare these findings to other research from other centers. This limitation is 
levied more so on the literature than the present study, but it is nonetheless impossible to 
provide context for how these findings relate to the perceptions of other analytic units. At 
best the results could be compared to studies where analysts were included in the fusion 
center sample (see Graphia-Joyal, 2010, Carter, 2015; Carter and Chermak, 2012; Chermak 
et al., 2013); however in each of these studies analysts were a minority of the sample.  
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 Lastly, fusion centers are highly dynamic organizations. They rely on variable 
funding streams (state, federal, and grant appropriations) and are responsive to 
environmental demands in the form of local and national threat priorities (Carter and 
Chermak, 2012; Carter, 2015). As a result, fusion centers may demonstrate operational 
improvements in the short term and thus identify remedies to the shortcomings observed 
in the present research. The benefit of this study having occurred during a time of 
organizational growth helps to illuminate the issues facing many fusion centers nationwide. 
The obstacles identified in the present study have been alluded to in national policy 
assessments of fusion centers (House of Representatives, 2013) as well as reports urging 
for research in this area (U.S. Senate, 2012. The present study is one of very few that have 
examined these organizational practices from a scholarly perspective and lends insights for 
future scholarship and improvements for practice.  
 Given these limitations, future research should explore analysts’ perceptions and 
awareness of the strategic goals of the fusion center and how the information gathering, 
analysis and dissemination practices are aligned with the future of the fusion center. 
Additionally, the law enforcement intelligence community needs more research on how 
well the analysts are able to anticipate and then meet the needs of the law enforcement and 
private sector communities. Finally, future studies should compare the information-sharing 
networks of state and regional fusion centers to help understand how best to organize an 
information-sharing initiative. A majority of the fusion centers are organized at the state 
level and many sharing initiatives such as JTTFs and HIDTAs are regional; yet little is 
known about how this type of organizational structure affects how well information is 
shared.     
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Conclusion 
Contemporary fusion centers are designed to facilitate information sharing and 
intelligence analysis among disparate organizations while enhancing the analytic capability 
of local law enforcement to be more effectively intelligence-led. Previous research has 
struggled to contextualize the analytic environment of fusion centers; a capacity at the heart 
of the organization’s mission. Findings from this research suggest that fusion center 
policymakers consider three action steps. First, fusion centers should seek to better 
understand the end-users of the analytic products they create. This pertains to both the 
organization types subscribed to the center to receive products, but also the geography(s) 
being served. It appears that intelligence products are either too general in nature or not 
applicable to all jurisdictions, resulting in diluted product effectiveness and less 
engagement with the center.  
Second, the findings suggest that while some information sharing is occurring, it is 
best achieved through personal relationships between analysts and members of external 
organizations. As such, fusion centers should consider adopting (or improving) a fusion 
center liaison officer (FLO) program that establishes specific personnel as points of contact 
to develop relationships with external organizations for purposes of trustworthy and 
efficient information sharing (Saupp, 2010). Lastly and related to the second suggestion, 
fusion centers should develop feedback loops, or try to develop more effective feedback 
loops, to best evaluate the effectiveness of analytic products. This could potentially be 
achieved through a FLO program or by conducting a formal assessment on a regularly 
scheduled basis to ensure analytic products are continuing to meet the needs of end-users. 
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This approach is consistent with the line of evidence coming from the police-researcher 
partnership studies that indicate the importance of personal relationships to facilitate 
effective partnerships for research (Rojek et al., 2015).  
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Appendix A: 2013 Fusion Center Assessment Items 
Characteristics of the Fusion Center of Study 
 
Organizational Policies and Practices 
 
Fusion 
Center of 
Study 
Fusion center has approved plans, policies, or standard operating 
procedures (SOP) for the receipt of federally generated threat information Yes 
Fusion center has a plan, policy or SOP that addresses the receipt and 
handling of National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) alerts Yes 
Fusion center has staff with a need to access classified information are 
cleared to at least the Secret level Yes 
Fusion center has access to Homeland Security Defense Network and/or 
FBINet (i.e., within fusion center or onsite) Yes 
Fusion center has access to sensitive but unclassified information systems  No 
Fusion center has approved plans, policies, or SOPs for assessing the local 
implications of time‐sensitive and emerging threat information Yes 
Fusion center has a documented analytic production plan Yes 
Fusion center has access to multidisciplinary subject matter experts (SME) 
within its area of responsibility (AOR) to inform analytic production No 
Fusion center has access to other fusion centers' multidisciplinary SMEs 
outside of its state to inform analytic production, as required Yes 
Fusion center has a process to provide DHS with information and/or 
intelligence that offers a local context to threat information in the event of 
an NTAS ‐ related alerts Yes 
Fusion center conducts threat assessments within its AOR No 
Fusion center contributes to or conducts a statewide risk assessment (threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence analysis) No 
Fusion center contributes to national‐level risk assessments  No 
Fusion center has a customer satisfaction mechanism for its analytic 
products Yes 
Fusion center evaluates the effectiveness of the customer feedback 
mechanism on an annual basis Yes 
All fusion center analysts have received at least 20 hours of issue‐specific 
training in the past 12 months No 
Fusion center has approved plans, policies or SOPs governing the 
procedures for the timely dissemination of products to customers within its 
AOR Yes 
Fusion center has a dissemination matrix  Yes 
Fusion center has a primary sensitive but unclassified mechanism to 
disseminate time sensitive information and products Yes 
Fusion center has a plan, policy or SOP that addresses dissemination of 
NTAS alerts to stakeholders within its AOR Yes 
Fusion center has a mechanism to disseminate NTAS alerts  Yes 
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Fusion center has a process for verifying the delivery of products to 
intended customers No 
Fusion center has an approved NSI Site plan or an approved plans, policies 
or SOPs governing the gathering of locally generated information Yes 
Fusion center has a tips and leads process Yes 
Fusion center has a process for identifying and managing information needs Yes 
Fusion center has a process for managing the gathering of locally‐
generated information to satisfy the fusion center’s information needs Yes 
Fusion center has approved Standing Information Needs (SINs) Yes 
Fusion center has an annual process to review and refresh SINs  Yes 
Fusion center has a process to inform DHS of protective measures 
implemented within its AOR in response to an NTAS alert Yes 
Fusion center has a request for information management process  Yes 
Fusion center has a privacy policy determined by DHS to be at least as 
comprehensive as the Information Sharing Environment Privacy Guidelines Yes 
Fusion center provides formal and standardized training to all personnel on 
the fusion center’s privacy policy annually Yes 
Fusion center's policies, processes, and mechanisms for receiving, 
cataloging, and retaining information (provided to the center) comply with 
28 C.F.R. Part 23 Yes 
Fusion center trains all personnel who access criminal intelligence systems 
in 28 C.F.R. Part 23 Yes 
Fusion center has identified a Privacy/CRCL Officer for the center  No 
Fusion center has a privacy policy outreach plan No 
Fusion center has an approved strategic plan No 
Fusion center conducts an annual financial audit Yes 
Fusion center completes annual operational cost assessment  Yes 
Fusion center conducts an exercise at least once a year No 
Fusion center measures its performance and determines the effectiveness of 
its operations relative to expectations it or its governing entity have defined No 
Fusion center has a designated Public Information Officer or Public Affairs 
Officer Yes 
Fusion center has an approved communication plan  No 
Fusion center has a process for capturing success stories  Yes 
Fusion center has an approved security plan that addresses personnel, 
physical and information security No 
Fusion center trains all personnel on the fusion center’s security plan No 
Fusion center has a designated Security Liaison  Yes 
Fusion center's Security Liaison (or other organization’s Security Liaison) 
completes annual training No 
Fusion center has access to the Central Verification System (CVS) No 
Fusion center's Security Liaison (or other organization’s Security Liaison) 
is trained on how to use CVS No 
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
Regional Fusion Center of Study 
 
 
 
Interview Number:  ________________________  Date:  __________________ 
 
 
*Interviews were preceded with an explanation of project participation and consent as 
well as a project introduction and overview from research team members.* 
 
**Some interview questions have been modified to protect the anonymity of the center of 
study.** 
 
 
 
Respondent Information 
 
Please describe your position within the fusion center. 
 
Please describe your professional background. 
 
 
 
Development of Intelligence Products 
 
Can you please describe the types of intelligence products you create? 
 Probe: Which types of products do you create most often? Why? 
 Probe: Which products do you believe are most useful by the recipients?  
Probe: Are there products you believe recipients want, or could use, that are not 
being created by the fusion center? If so, please explain. 
 
Can you please describe the sources of information and data that you use when creating 
intelligence products? 
 Probe: Which sources of information are most useful and do you most frequently 
utilize? 
 
Can you please explain how intelligence products are formatted and organized? 
Probe: Does the format and organization of intelligence products vary, or depend 
on, certain factors? More specifically, does the format of intelligence products 
vary depending on the security level, intended audience, product type, or 
dissemination method? 
 
Has your fusion center identified information requirements? More specifically, has your 
center identified the types of intelligence products most desired by recipients?  
 Probe: If yes or no, please describe how, why, or why not. 
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Has the fusion center received any feedback from participating and/or peer organizations 
regarding the types of products they wish to receive from the DVIC?  
 If yes, please describe. 
 If no, why do you think this is? Do you believe is feedback needed? 
 
 
 
Dissemination of Intelligence Products 
 
Can you please describe the method(s) for disseminating intelligence products? 
 Probe: Which method(s) are most commonly used? Why? 
 
Can you please describe the security and clearance level of the intelligence products 
disseminated by the fusion center (such as FOU, Unclassified, LES, etc.)? 
 Probe: Which security or clearance level is most common? Why? 
 
Can you describe the recipients of the fusion centers products? More specifically, who is 
the intended audience, or audiences, that receive the intelligence products?  
 Probe: Are different products created for different recipients? 
Probe: Are you aware of the types of recipients to which you disseminate 
intelligence products? 
 If yes, please describe. 
 If no, please explain why not? Or do you believe you need to know? 
 
Can you please describe the frequency of the intelligence product dissemination?  
Probe: Does the frequency vary by type of product. If so, in what ways?  
 
Who is responsible for disseminating intelligence products from the fusion center? More 
specifically, do analysts disseminate products once they are completed? Or does a 
supervisor review and then distribute? Please explain. 
 
Can you please describe the process through which dissemination listservs are created?  
Probe: How does an organization go about being included on the dissemination 
list to receive products? 
 Probe: Do organizations ever request to unsubscribe to the listserv? If so, why? 
 
 
 
Awareness of the Fusion Center 
 
Has your fusion center communicated to other law enforcement the resources, or 
services, the center can provide?  
 If so, please explain how. 
 If not, why not? 
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Has your fusion center attempted to market the fusion center to external organizations 
that are both law enforcement and non-law enforcement (such as private sector or public 
health)? 
 If yes, how so and to whom? 
 If not, why not and do you believe it is necessary? 
 
 
Do you believe intelligence products and dissemination methods from your fusion center 
will change in the future? Please explain.  
Given there are other fusion centers located within the similar geographic proximity of 
your center, does your center attempt to provide unique intelligence products that are 
more relevant to local criminal/threat issues? Please explain. 
 
 
How do you envision the role of your fusion centers as compared/contrasted to the other 
fusion centers in your region? 
 
 
***Each interview concluded by thanking respondents for their time and providing each 
respondent with research team contact information (that was also available in the consent 
document).*** 
 
